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ASSIGNMENT.
The defendant was indebted to one Howard in a definite sum.
Howard became obligated to the plaintiffs for professional services
rendered, and assigned by deed to the plaintiffs so much
of the said debt as would cover all proper costs and
Assignment
charges not exceeding in the whole £30, and the plainof a Definite
tiffs gave notice of the assignment to the defendant.
Part of an
Existing Debt A bill of costs, &c., for £32 was presented to Howard
but apparently not paid, and the plaintiffs brought suit
Is Valid
claiming the 63o as part of the debt due from defendant to Howard and assigned by deed to the plaintiff. The defense
was that the assignment was invalid because it is merely an assignment of part of a debt. Sec. 25, sub-sec. 6 of Judicature Act 1873, "Any'
absolute assignment, by writing * * * of any debt or other legal
chose in action, of which express notice in writing shall have been
given to the debtor * * * shall be effectual in law * * *."
Held, by Darling, J.: Where there is an existing debt there can
be a valid assignment of a defined portion of it Judgment for the
plaintiff for £30. Skipper & Tucker v. Holloway and another, 79 L. J.,
i K. B. [191o] 91.
The point here raised was res nova in the courts of England. The
question had previously been discussed in several cases but no exact
opinion bad been given upon it. It is said the courts have avoided deciding it. i Enc. of Laws of Eng. 565. The language of Lord Coleridge, C. J., in Brice v. Bannister, 1878, 3 Q. B. D. 569, was broad enough
to support the rule that a portion of any debt could be assigned. That
rule is followed in ex parte Moss, 1884, 14 Q. B. D. 310. In recent
years, however, the English judges have cast doubt on the correctness
of these decisions. Durham Bros. v. Robertson [I898], 1 Q. B. 744;
Jones v. Humphries [19o2], I K. B. io; Hughes v. Pump House Co.
[1902], 2 K. B. i9o. In the second of these cases Darling, J., himself
lent his authority to the doubt, rather of the state of the law in England than of the soundness of any rule.
Alexander v. Steinhardt, Walker & Co. [1903], 2 K. B. 208, may be
distinguished. There a principal directed his factor to sell certain
goods and out of the proceeds to pay B £4oo, and the balance to Alexander, and advised the latter of what he had done. It was held at nisi
prius that this constituted a valid assignment to Alexander. Presumably the £4oo had been paid to B, and therefore the assignment to Alexander was total. The assignment embraced a complete power of attorney for all that was then owing the assignor.
At common law the partial assignee acquired no rights. The injustice of submitting the debtor to a multiplicity of suits on the same
cause of action was sufficient to establish the rule at law. Jermyn v.
Moffatt, 75 Pa. 399. But in equity, the partial assignee was fully protected. His right was in the nature of enforcing an obligation on the
assignor to give to him the share in the proceeds of the chose in action
when the assignor collected it. Caldwell v. Hartafee,70 Pa. 74. It has
(5o5)
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been thought that the nature of this right was in analogy to an equitable
charge on land, the subject- of the charge being the chose in action.
Ames' Cases on Trusts, 64 note. On the other hand the total assignee
at common law, acquired rights which, in the absence of special circumstances, he could enforce only at law. Hammond v. Messenger, 9
Sim. 327 (Eng. 1838). His right was a power of attorney to sue at
law in the assignor's name. In the absence of statutes he could not
sue in his own name. The sub-section cited of the Judicature Act,
gave him that power by providing that the assignment should "be effectual in law to pass and transfer the legal right." The Court in
the principal case have thought this sufficient to cover an assignment
of a part of the chose in action. In America the general rule would
appear to be the other way and the partial assignee is compelled to work
out his rights in equity against the assignor.
BANKRUPTCY.
A referee in bankruptcy made an order denying the motion of the
petitioner to quash objections filed to his claim by the trustee. The
objections admitted the petitioner's claim but set up a
Counter-Claim counter claim greater than the amount of the petitioner's demand. The counter claim was alleged to have
by Trustee
arisen out of a certain contract induced by false and
fraudulent representations of the petitioner. The Court admitted the
counter claim. In re Harper, 175 Fed. 412.
Under Sec. 7o a (6) of the amended Act "rights of action arising
upon * * * injury to, his property" pass to the trustee. A claim
may be the subject of set off though it is unliquidated. Collier, Bankruptcy (7th Ed.), Sec. 7oa (6). The provision of the act which denies the right to prove a claim founded on the fraud of the bankrupt
does not apply to a claim in which the trustee is relying on the fraud
of the creditor as the basis of the counter claim. The Court was of
the opinion that the facts upon which the counter claim was alleged
to have arisen would constitute a cause of action arising out of injury
to the bankrupt's property, and as such passed to the trustee. The
decision in It re Becker, 139 Fed. 366, I5 A. B. R. 228, was criticised
on the ground that it would be absurd to require the referee to
allow a claim upon which a cross action might be maintained, to compel the trustee to pay dividends upon it, and then to sue in a separate action to recover damages due the estate. In support of this
argument, the Court cited the words of Sec. 68a of the Act, "In all
cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of the
bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall
be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or
paid." Thus the Court considered the above counter claim to be a debt
within the meaning of the above section, and treats this section as applying to cases where there is potentially a debt as well as to cases
where the actual debt has been finally established.
Although this preliminary question was decided according to the
contention of the trustee, it was still necessary that the facts upon
which the counter claim was based be satisfactorily shown. The Court
intimated that the case did not show such evidence of misrepresentation as was asserted by the trustee, but that question was not properly before them and was not fully discussed.
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).
It has been held for many years as settled law, that upon the bankruptcy of a member of a stock exchange his seat, subject to the rules
of the exchange, passes to his trustee. Where the rules
Stock
of the exchange provide that the proceeds of the sale
Exchange Seat
as Asset
of the seat shall be used to satisfy the claims of other
members before those of outside creditors, it is considered that they are neither contrary to public policy or to the Bankrupt Act, and that they must be obeyed by the trustee. Hyde v. Woods,
94 U. S. (1876) 523; In re Page, 107 Fed. Rep. (191o)
89; affirmed
187 U. S. (1903) 596; It re Werder, io Fed. Rep. (i882) 275; 15 Fed.
Rep. (1883) 789.
In re Gregory, 174 Fed. Rep. (igo) 629, carries the proposition
one step further. The bankrupt's assets there consisted of his seat,
which as stated above would'pass to the trustee subject to the rules,
anl the profits accruing from some of his transactions on the Consolidated Exchapge (N. Y.) amounting to some $315.oo which were.
collected by the Exchange. These moneys the trustee laid claim to.
The Court considering the right to buy and sell stocks on the
Exchange a sort of license, Hyde v. Woods, supra, decided that the
profits arising from the exercise of the license were of the same nature as the money arising from the sale of the license itself, and so
passed to the trustee subject to the rules and regulations of the Exchange. These provided that they should first be devoted, like the
proceeds of the seat, to satisfying the claims of members, and as the
liabilities of the bankrupt to his fellow brokers far exceeded the total
amount realized both from the sale of his seat and the collection of
his profits, the application of the trustee was denied and the Exchange
allowed to keep the money, thus establishing a rule which should be
of considerable practical importance.
CONTRACTS.
In Nielson v. International Text-Book Co., 75 Atl. (Me.) 330 (Io),
an infant sought to recover the consideration money, which he had
paid under a contract. The contract called for a correspondence course in electrical engineering. The inInfants:
fant made several payments and then decided to avoid
Necessaries:
Recovery of
the contract. He returned several books, which he had
Money Paid
received and then brought suit to recover the money.
The defense was that the contract was for necessaries,
which of course raised the point, what is a necessary? The lower
Court charged, "the term necessaries generally speaking is not confined merely to such things as are required for bare subsistence but
includes those things without which an individual cannot reasonably
exist, and which are useful, suitable and necessary for his support, use
and comfort, taking into consideration his station in life" and left the
question to the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, holding that it was a question for the jury except in a very clear case.
This is the view adopted by most jurisdictions and it is based on good
reasoning. Obviously some things are not necessaries at present, as
for instance an aeroplane, but where there is a fair question of its
being a necessary, owing to the infant's station in life, it must be left
to the jury. And this is the usual result. See Davis v. Caldwell, 66
Mass. 512 (1853).
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It was also decided, that the infant could sue for his money paid on
the voidable contract without putting the defendant in statu quo.
Here the goods supplied were returned, but the same ruling has been
made where the infant has squandered or destroyed the property. The
more general rule is only to compel return of property if he has it,
and not to make him account for any depreciation in value. Some
jurisdictions are contra on this point, notably New York. See Wheelcr
& Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 2 Misc. Rep. 236 (1893).
EXECUTION.
The ground floor of a building was used by the plaintiff as a store,
and the floor above as a dwelling-house. There was no internal communication between the apartments upstairs and the store
Sheriff
below. The upstairs portion was reached 'by steps, which
Breaking
Outer Doors
were outside the building altogether, and through a door
on the upstairs flat. The defendant, a sheriff, in levying under an execution process against the plaintiff, broke open the
outer door of the store and seized goods therein. It was held that this
was a breaking of the outer door of a dwelling-house, that the seizure
was unlawful, and that the sheriff was responsible in damages to the
plaintiff.

Hudson v. Fletcher, 12 Western Canada, 15 (1909).

It is settled law that the outer door of a man's dwelling-house may
not be broken open by a sheriff in executing process. Lee v. Ganscl, i
Cowp. i. The reason assigned is that "otherwise the consequences
would be fatal, for it would leave the family within naked and exposed
to thieves and robbers." This reason would not seem to apply to our
principal case, for the family would be no more exposed to thieves
and robbers by the door of the store being forced, than they were
before, since there was no communication between the two. However,
the Court lays down the stricter rule, that in order to justify the
breaking of an outer door, the building must not be connected with
the dwelling-house nor within the curtilage.
Instances where the same building has been used for a store and a
dwelling are rare in this line of cases. A one-roomed building, which
was used for both a dwelling and a store, was held to be a dwelling
house. Welsh v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 92 (1885). But in a case, exactly
like our principal case, except that there was internal communication
between the store and the dwelling above, and the door of the store
was used both to get into the store and into the apartments above, it
was held that it was lawful for the sheriff to break open the door of
the store, as it was not a dwelling house. The door to the dwelling
room upstairs was considered the outer door. The reason given was
that otherwise all protection could be taken from the occupants of
the dwelling above. The sheriff might easily gain admittance to the
store peaceably and then be able to break open the doors to the rooms
above, since they would then be inner doors. Stearns v. Vincent, 5o
Mich. 209 (1883). Our principal case would seem to be in accord with
the law of dwelling houses in burglary. Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y. 561
(1878). But it seems to be admitted that no analogy between the two
can be drawn, because of the difference in the nature of the offense
and the corresponding difference in the reason for the rules. Stearns
v. Vincent, supra; Hodder v. Williams (I895), 2 Q. B. 663.
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EMINENT DOMAIN.
The distinction, which has been drawn in damage cases for the
loss of easement of lateral support of abutting property, in a street,
between public and private use to which the street is
Damages for
about to be put, served as the basis in In re Board of
Lossof
Easement of
Transit Commissioners (Appeals, N. Y., Dec. 19o9) for
Lateral
a distinction between a governmental and a proprietary
Stpprt Of
use of the street by the city authorities.
In this case, an abutting owner. owning no part of
the street, was damaged by the settling of his land due to subway constructibn by the city of New York, in the street. The Court declared
the subway a proprietary use of the street, inasmuch as it was conducted as a business enterprise, and its use restricted.only to those licensed by the purchase of tickets.
The general rule, is, of course, that in such a case, there can be
no recovery where the damage due to the loss of easement of lateral
support is caused by use of the property for street purposes. Cheever
v. Stedd, Fed. Cases No. 2,634; Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231; or where
there is no negligence. Park v. Seattle, 5 Wash. i.
But the Court here held that this case does not come within any
well-recognized exception to the Constitutional provision that private
property shall not be taken for public use without compensation,-such
as sewers, grading streets, etc., and the plaintiff was therefore allowed
to recover.
In Pennsylvania (Stork v. Phila., l96 Pa., ioi) the rule is that the
absolute liability imposed by the constitution on the municipality is
limited to that liability which is the direct, immediate, necessary, and
unavoidable consequence of the act of eminent domain itself, irrespective of negligence.
INSURANCE.
Morin v. Anglo-Canodian Fire Insurance Co., 12 W. L. R. Canada,
387 (I9O9), furnishes a somewhat novel question. The Insurance Co.
insured property of the plaintiff, described in the policy
Fire Insurance: as "a one-story frame shingle roofed building owned by
iegac
the assured and occupied as a sporting house." In a
suit brought on the policy, the defense raised the point,
that it was an illegal contract and therefore void. It was found, that
altho' the insurance company officials knew that the plaintiff intended
to use the premises as a bawdy house, yet they themselves did not
intend that it should be used that way. The Court refused to rule,
that an insurance upon property illegally used at the time of the insurance was null and void, regardless of the intent and purposes of
the parties. The contract of insurance was voidable at the option of
the insurers upon their discovering the illegal purpose for which the
property was being used. But this they knew all along and since they
had not avoided the policy and also since the illegal use had ceased at
the time of the fire, they are liable upon the policy.
The negative part of the Court's decision is unquestionably sound.
There seem to be no authorities to the contrary and the tendency is
certainly not to set aside contracts, on the broad general ground of
public policy. But having decided that the contract itself is not illegal,
there seems to be a difference of opinion, as to whether knowledge
that a party is going to use property obtained under the contract in an
illegal manner, makes it void. Some courts say yes; others like our
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principal case hold something more is necessary, an intent that the
other party should use the property in that manner. The cases usually
arise under sales and leases of property and not under insurance, but
the same rules would seem applicable. See Reed v. Brewer, 36 S. W.
(Texas) 99 (1896) ; Ernst v. Crosby, 14o N. Y. 364 (1893) ; Graves v.
Johnlson, 156 Mass. 211 (1892) ; Hanauer v. Doone, 12 Wallace (U. S.
Sup.), 342 (1870).
LIBEL.
A reporter of the Sunday Chronicle sent to his paper a letter from
a summer watering-place. The letter contained uncomplimentary matter concerning "Artemus Jones," a name invented by the
Danger of
reporter. For the publication of this letter, a gentleman
whose name actually was Artemus Jones brought an acFictitious
tion against the Sunday Chronicle, proved that several
Name
persons had thought him to be the Artemus Jones referred to, and recovered ;I75o damages. The judgment was affirmed
by the King's Bench Division in Hulton v. Jones, L. R. (igo), II K.
B. D. 444, and by the House of Lords in L. R. (191o) Appeal Cases,
20. Both courts proceeded on the theory that in an action for libel the
injury to the plaintiff was alone material. It is submitted that the
learned justices failed to recognize that a defendant can only be liable
in tort when he has failed in the performance of a duty which he
owes the plaintiff. To require a writer to search all the directories in
the land before daring to publish derogatory matter in connection with
a fictitious name, is to impose an unreasonably high standard of care
upon those who provide us with our daily literature.
For a closer analysis and more detailed criticism of this case, see a
note in 58 U. of P. Law Review, 166 (Dec. igog).
NEGLIGENCE.
A landowner placed a horse which to his knowledge was ferocious,
in a pasture field through which members of the public habitually
crossed without leave, traversing a more or less defined
Owner's
path and passing through a gate which was sometimes
Liability to
locked and sometimes merely fastened on a latch. He
Trespassers
Without
had previously warned off persons crossing the field but
Leave, whose
had refused to take legal proceedings against them for
Presence
is
trespass. The plaintiff, while so crossing the field withTolerated
out leave from the owner, was bitten by the horse. Held,
to fasten a liability on the landowner for the injury to the plaintiff,
it must be shown that he owed some duty towards such persons as
the plaintiff; that under the above circumstances no affirmative duty
rested on the landowner toward the plaintiff who was a trespasser,
knowing well that he had no right to be there but merely assuming that
as a result of the good nature of the owner, no action would be taken
to interfere with him. The plaintiff took upon himself the risk of
all dangers there might be in the field, if used in the way such a field
is ordinarily used, and the use made by the owner for the pasture of
his horse was such an ordinary use. Buckley, L. J., dissenting. Lowery v. Walker, 19io i K. B. 173.
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In effect the Court of Appeals has refused to recognize a duty existing in a fourth class of the relationships existing between the owners
of land and persons coming thereon. The relationships toward the
owner usually said to exist are: (i) bare trespasser, when the leading
case of Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing.. 628 defines the extent of the duty
owed by the landowner, (2) licensee, when the duty consists (a) in
making the premises as bad in appearance as they are in fact or as it
is usually stated, as good in fact as they appear; Gaubret v. Edgerton,
L. R. 2 C. P. 371, and (b) in managing the usual business one conducts there so that the failure to use ordinary care will not cause
injury to those licensees whose presence is to be expected, Gallagherv.
Humphrey, io W. R. 664, and (3) invitee, when the duty of the owner
of the premises includes use of reasonable care that the premises shall
be safe, and that the kind of business conducted there shall be with
due regard to the presence of such persons, Indermaur v. Dames, L. R.
I C. P. 274. The plaintiff in the present case sought to bring himself.
within the second class at least, on the ground that though he was on
the land without leave or circumstances implying intentional encouragement, yet there had been a tacit acquiescence in his presence from the
refusal to vigorously interfere with him, which imposed a duty on the
owner sufficient to support this action. This argument was refused by
the court and the rights of the plaintiff present under such circumstances
were held to rise no higher than those of a bare trespasser. Moreover,
Kennedy, L. J., said that even had the plaintiff been a licensee, he had
established no facts sufficient to enable him to recover, p. 197. Had
that been the relation borne by the plaintiff to the owner, he accepted the
use of the way subject to the owner's use of the field for ordinary purposes, which included the pasturing of horses and cattle of various degrees of temper. He must, therefore, to establish his case, show the
adding by negligence or otherwise of some danger on the part of the
owner, after permission or license given to the plaintiff. Gallagher v.
Humphrey, supra.
For a discussion of the state of the authorities on the points involved, see comment on the decision of the same case in the Divisional
Court, 58 University of Pennsylvania Law Review iio (Nov. igog).
In a rush of customers occasioned by an announcement of special
bargains at a certain counter near a stairway in the defendant company's store, the plaintiff was pushed down the stairway and injured. The Court overruled objections to a
Bargain
direction of a verdict for the defendant in the court
Counter Rush
below. Lord v. Sherer Dry Goods Co., 90 N. E. (Mass.
191o) 1153.
It was shown in the present case that the injury was not due to any
defect in the stairway or other premises of the defendant, but to the
rush of customers down the stairway. The defendant was not negligent. The so-called "platform" cases were cited to the Court, but rejected as authority for the present case, and properly so. While these
"platform" cases are applicable to elevated, subway and certain other
classes of railways, it is submitted that they do not control th, principal case. There is, in those cases, a better opportunity for observing
the probabilities of injury, and, generally, admission to the platform is
guarded by the railway company, and thus the number of persons to be
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allowed upon the platform at any given time is within the control of
the company. Furthermore, the probability of injury is readily to be
foreseen in those cases, while in the principal case, it was not so. Under
the circumstances the railway company is guilty of actionable negligence toward a passenger who suffers injury from such overcrowding.
For this general subject see notes to Thompson v. Gardener, &c., Co.,
118 Am. St. Rep. 459; 193 Mass. 133; 78 N. E. 854.

In the case of Vincent, et al. v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 124
N. W. (191o) 221, a peculiar combination of circumstances arose. The
defendants were the owners of a steamer which moored
at plaintiff's wharf in order to discharge her cargo.
Liability of
Ship Owner
While there a violent storm arose, so that it would have
for Damages
been extremely hazardous for the master to have atto Wharf
tempted to take her from the dock. He, therefore, allowed the vessel to lie alongside for two days until the
storm abated, and several times changed the mooring lines as they became chafed or inadequate to secure her owing to the increasing violence of the gales. From the continual pounding of the ship against
the pier it was damaged to a considerable extent, and on suit being
brought a verdict for five hundred dollars was awarded the (lock
owners. On appeal the Court, in affirming the judgment, based their
decision upon the theory that the ship owners had deliberately used
the wharf for the purpose of saving ther own more valuable property,
and having thus preserved their vessel at the expense of the plaintiffs',
they should reimburse the latter for their damage. In support of this
Ploof v. Putnam, 2o L. R. A. (N. S.)

[1909] 152, is cited, where it

was decided that a vessel's master was not guilty of trespass in tying
up to a private dock to save his ship owing to stress of weather. The
Court states that they have no doubt that if in such case, the dock was
injured, the vessel's owner would be liable, and they also suggest that
if in the principal case the master had made use of a valuable cable
lying on the dock to better secure his vessel, he would be liable for
damage thereto.
It would seem, however, that the Court omits from both of these
supposed cases the fact that in neither of them was any payment made
for the use of the dock or cable. In the principal case this element
was present. Is it not to be supposed that a dock owner would fix
bis rates high enough to protect himself from injuries to his property
not d',e o negligence? Admittedly he could not recover had the ship
been hurled against the pier by a violent tempest, and yet he claims
damages because a vessel lying at his wharf, where she has a lawful
right to be and for which right she is paying, continues to lie there
to save herself from destruction by a like act of God. Does he not
rather hold out his dock as a place of safety for his customers while
there, and taking the risk of damage not due to their carelessness
reimburse himself therefor, through his charges? The question is a
close one, but it would seem that perhaps on this reasoning the dissenting opinion is entitled to the greater weight.
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An electric company maintained live wires, which were attached to
a railroad bridge by wooden arms, at a distance of two feet out and
away from the bridge. Quasi-licensees of the railroad
Live Electric
used the bridge for foot-travel. A child who.had been
Wires
sitting on the guard-rail changed his position and was
killed by the live wire. It was held that the electric
company was not liable. Netherly v. Twit State Gas & Electric Co.,
75 At. Rep. 8 (igo.) There was nothing in the location of these
wires tending to render the use of the bridge as a footpath dangerous,
and there was nothing in the manner in which they were strung to
allure children.
The general rule is, that the business of transmitting electricity must
be transacted with a very high regard for the safety of the public, and
the thoughtlessness of children must be taken into account; but an
electric company is not an insurer of the safety of children. The duty
of an electric company to insulate its live wires is limited to points
where there is reason to apprehend that a person may come in contactwith the wires.
Nelson v. Branford Lighting Co., 75 Conn. 548, allowed recovery
where a boy, amusing himself on a highway bridge, came in contact
with an electric wire strung along the side of the bridge; the Court
saying, "the purposes of a highway are not regarded as wholly restricted to serving the right of passage."
But maintaining naked electric wires on top of a shed was not such
negligence as to permit recovery for injuries received by a boy in
climbing the shed to rescue a ball, though such action was frequently
done by the local youth. Sullivan v. Boston, etc., Co., 156 Mass. 378.
In Temple v. McComb City, etc., Co., 89 Miss. i, the Court decided
that, "the immemorial habit of small boys to climb little oak trees filled
with abundant branches reaching almost to the ground is a habit which
corporations stretching their wires over such trees must take notice of."
The test seems to be, whether or not the light company could have
been expected to reasonably anticipate that children would do what the
particular child injured did. Shefeld Co. v. Morton, 49 So. 772;
In Cumberland,
etc.,Electrc
Co. v. Co.,
Martin's
Keefe
v. Narragansett
21 R. Adm'r..
I. 575. 76 S. W. 394, it was
held that defendant owed no
duty to a bare licensee to properly
maintain injured,
a wire. under
But an
vhere
plaintiff
is rightfully
in theowes
placehim
where
he
was
implied
license,
the
defendant
a duty
to see that he is not injured while on the premises.
South
Electric
9o N. rightfully
E. 786 (i91o),
holds
the Bearngt
company v.
liable
for Bend
an injury
doneCo.,
a person
in the situation where he was injured, as the company owed a duty to such class of
persons,
and ofcould
reasonably
anticipated
theirwvre
presence.
In this
case, a pole
the have
defendant
company
had a live
in a dangerous
position upon it. The city maintained fire and police wires on the pole,
and the plaintiff, an employee of the city, while climbing the pole, came
in contact with the defendant's wire and was injured.
Rabb, P. J., says, "the duties and obligations of the respective parties to each other, and to their respective employws, in this case is
very analogous to those of railways and other common carriers, whose
lines intersect, or pass over, premises in which both have rights, as
illustrated by the case of Chicago v. Vandenberg. 164 Ind. 470." In this
case it is said (where the respondent was on the premises of the appellant when injured) "he was there not as appellant's servant, nor
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merely at its sufferance, but in a legal sense, upon the invitation given
through the contract entered into between the two railroad companies.
The appellant owed him a legal duty to exercise reasonable care to
keep all parts of its road in a reasonably safe condition."
In Bearning v. South Bend Electric Co., though there was no contract, yet an analogous duty may be inferred from the peculiar character of the business in which the parties were engaged, the relation of
the city's wires to appellants' wires, and the imperative necessity in the
successful operation of the wires of both, that the employ~s of each
should use the same pole.
The defendant was making excavations on his land, and it became
necessary to blast. A water-main in a public street, twenty feet distant from where the blasts were fired, was broken by
the concussions, and the basement of the plaintiff's house
Liability for
was flooded. It was held, since there was no proof of
Blasting
negligence on the defendant's part, he could not be held
liable. Derrick v. Kelly, i2o N. Y. Supp. 996 (igio.)
It is settled law, that a person setting off blasts on his own property
is responsible for damages caused by rocks, thrown on the lands of
another. There is sufficient to sustain an action of trespass, irrespective of the question of negligence. Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 43i (1853) ;
Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 (1849). But there is a division of judicial opinion as to liability for injury to person or property from
concussions caused by blasting. Here there is no technical trespass.
Some jurisdictions, applying the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands, make
no destruction and hold there is an absolute liability for all injuries
caused by such a dangerous agency. This liability is held to arise from
the extraordinary use to which the defendant is putting his property,
which amounts to a prima facie nuisance, and which can not be justified by showing that due care was exercised. Colton v. Onderdonk,
69 Cal. 155 (1886) ; Fitzsimmons v. Braun, 199 Ill. 39o
Lougtin v. Persell, 3o Mont. 3o6 (19o4).

(19o2);

The weight of authority, however, seems to be in accord with our
principal case, holding that where there is no actual physical invasion
of personal or property rights, the injury is daminu absque injuria, so
long as the blasting operatons are conducted with due care. Booth v.
Rome, etc., R. R. Co., 14o N. Y. 267 (1893); Page v. Dempsey, 184
This
N. Y. 245 (19o6); Senion v. Henry, 62 N. J. L. 486 (1898).
would seem to be the better view, especially under the facts of the
prcscrt case. Here blasting was necessary in excavating, and unless
permitted, the value of the lot would have been seriously affected, if
not rendered worthless. In such case blasting should not be included
in the exceptional category of extra-hazardous occupations, and the
doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands should not apply. Of course, a higher
degree of care, commensurate with the risk involved, should be required, but the injury should not be more than prima facie evidence of
negligence.
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TRESPASS.
The case of Cope v. Shaye, L. R. i K. B. 18 (i91o), holds, that

if a fire breaks out on land, the tenant of the sporting rights is entitled
to adopt such means on the land for extinguishing the
Putting Out a fire as may in the circumstances be necessary for the
preservation of his sporting rights. Thus, the starting
Fire
of a backfire in the heather is not a trespass by such a
tenant, as he is entitled to destroy so much heather as is necessary to
save the game from destruction by fire. He is doing no more than
preserving his rights.
This is one of the very few modern cases in which the Court finds
occasion to cite a Year Book. Darling, J., refers to a case in 9 Edw.
4, where Littleton, 3., said: "Et inesme le by si home fer negligence
suffra son meason d'arder, jes que sue son vicin fuisse debrus, son
meason fur eschue le peril que folt avehi a moy fer l'arder, car si leo
suffra le meason d'estoier, ilfurr arder que jeo ne fuisse queincher le
feive apres." A dictum in Carter v. Thomas, i Q. B. 673 (1893),
shows that the Court was inclined to adopt this view, so that an interesting question might have arisen in this case, whether if the defendant had been a mere stranger, and thinking that the plaintiffs' method
of putting out the fire was inadequate, he could have entered and
fought it himself.
It would seem, that if the defendant had leased the shooting rights
merely, he would have less right to actively destroy a part of the leased
property than if his lease gave him a wider privilege of possession.

